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Abstract. Content distribution applications such as digital
broadcasting, video-on-demand services (VoD), video con-
ferencing, surveillance and telesurgery are confronted with
difficulties - besides the inevitable compression and quality
challenges - with respect to intellectual property management,
authenticity, privacy regulations, access control etc. Meeting
such security requirements in an end-to-end video distribution
scenario poses significant challenges. If the entire content is
encrypted at the content creation side, the space for signal
processing operations is very limited. Decryption, followed
by video processing and re-encryption is also to be avoided as
it is far from efficient, complicates key management and could
expose the video to possible attacks. Additionally, also when
the content is delivered and decrypted, the protection is gone.
Watermarking can complement encryption in these scenarios
by embedding a message within the content itself containing
for example ownership information, unique buyer codes or
content descriptions. Ideally, securing the video distribution
should therefore be possible throughout the distribution chain
in a flexible way allowing the encryption, watermarking and
encoding/transcoding operations to commute.
This paper introduces the reader to the relevant techniques
that are needed to implement such an end-to-end commutative
security system for video distribution, and presents a practi-
cal solution for encryption and watermarking compliant with
H.264/AVC and the upcoming HEVC (High Efficiency Video
Coding) video coding standards. To minimize the overhead
and visual impact, a practical trade-off between the security of
the encryption routine, robust watermarking and transcoding
possibilities is investigated. We demonstrate that our com-
bined commutative protection system effectively scrambles
video streams, achieving SSIM (Structural Similarity Index)
values below 0.2 across a range of practical bit rates, while
allowing robust watermarking and transcoding.
Commuting: a protection solution for
an end-to-end video distribution system
In current video distribution scenarios, it is often hard for the
content producers to keep track of the distribution of their
content due to the number of middlemen in the value chain
that sit between the content producer and the end consumer.
Fig. 1 shows a typical end-to-end video distribution chain,
where (possibly encrypted) video content is delivered by the
content producer to the distribution network via a dedicated
channel (e.g. a satellite channel) or video storage servers.
Network providers or cable operators pick up the content and
might want to optimize their bandwidth and the quality-of-
service to the end users by transcoding the video stream. The
classical example is the case in which the ultimate destina-
tion of the video is not known in advance and can vary from
an HDTV to a cell phone. Similarly, when (re)distributing
TV signals in a broadcast environment, transrating is used to
steer the bit rate of individual channels before multiplexing,
hereby keeping the total bit rate of the bundle of multiplexed
TV channels constant. To deal with these varying transport
networks and end user devices, appropriate video encoding
technologies such as the popular H.264/AVC standard and its
proposed successor HEVC are required to handle the variable
bandwidth conditions and error-prone network behavior.
Guaranteeing secure delivery of content to the consumer
and beyond in such an heterogeneous environment there-
fore poses a number of practical hurdles. Not surprisingly,
combined encryption and watermarking systems for the com-
pressed domain are only sparsely covered in literature, e.g.
[26, 31] for JPEG2000 images, [19] to adapt, encrypt and
authenticate MPEG-21 & H.264/AVC video, whereas [30] is
the most recent survey paper on protecting H.264/AVC video.
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Fig. 1. Example of a video distribution chain.
As indicated in the abstract, we thus need a flexible sys-
tem that allows for commuting the encryption, watermarking
and encoding/transcoding operations. Namely, the latter two
should be (1) both applicable in the encrypted domain and
(2) mutually compatible (i.e. transcoding shall not affect the
watermarking and vice versa).
There are three approaches to realize requirement (1):
1. Homomorphic encryption: the data is fully encrypted
and algebraic operations on the plaintext can be real-
ized by performing a (possibly different) algebraic op-
erations on the ciphertext, cfr. [13];
2. Invariant encryption: the data is fully encrypted but
has invariant subsets (leaving room for signal process-
ing thereon), e.g. the recent [27];
3. Partial encryption: only part of the data is encrypted
(again leaving room for signal processing on the re-
maining set), cfr. [13].
Homomorphic encryption provides the most elegant solution,
however, as explained in the tutorial paper [16], most effi-
cient homomorphic schemes, e.g. [23], have a limited set
of possible signal operations (the same holds for the invari-
ant encryption approach), while current schemes that do of-
fer a richer algebraic approach, e.g. [11], are not efficient.
This basically prohibits the first two encryption systems to be
used in transcoding scenarios. Regarding watermarking, in
[12] the (multiplicative) homomorphic encryption properties
of the RSA cryptosystem are combined with linear and addi-
tive watermarking algorithms in which the detection can be
performed by correlation (for instance the so-called spread
spectrum technique [7]), while in [15], it is shown that the
commutativity of the encryption and watermarking operations
can be weakened and an example for MPEG-2 video based on
additive watermarking is presented and investigated.
Requirement (2) can be met as long as the watermark can
be embedded compliant with the compressed domain or sur-
vives (i.e. is robust against) transcoding. The latter is ex-
actly where the two previously mentioned combined encryp-
tion and watermarking systems fail. This basically leaves us
with partial encryption as the (current?) path to follow.
Note that in broadcasting systems, audio distribution
needs to be considered as well. Typically, compressed audio
and video signals are multiplexed into a single container, e.g.
an MPEG Transport Stream. Such a container can provide
additional metadata, synchronization, and error correction for
the encapsulated streams. The audio signals in the container
can additionally be secured, e.g. by using partial encryption
schemes such as in [29]. However, in this paper we will
concentrate on video.
In the next section, we first give a survey of the transcod-
ing methodologies and both protection techniques we envi-
sion before we introduce our novel H.264/AVC & HEVC
format-compliant partial encryption and robust watermark-
ing system for secure video distribution. In the performance
demonstration section we show that our encryption method
effectively scrambles video streams and illustrate the perfor-
mance of watermark embedding before and during encoding,
along with the effect of applying transcoding operations to
reduce the bit rate of the encrypted video streams.
Secure video distribution in practice
Encryption, watermarking, and transcoding solutions are
strongly dependent on the underlying video coding stan-
dards that are used for video transmission. Over the last
two decades, significant efforts have been spent on defining
efficient video coding specifications. This led to a number
of successful standards, in particular MPEG-2, H.264/AVC,
and HEVC. The first version of H.264/AVC was finalized in
2003 by the Joint Video Team of ISO/IEC MPEG and ITU-T
VCEG, and was extended with several annexes and profiles
since then. H.264/AVC supports a wide range of applica-
tions, bit rates and resolutions, and its efficiency led to wide
adoption in broadcasting, over-the-top video, and mobile
video distribution. H.264/AVC achieves a bit rate reduction
of about 50% when compared to MPEG-2 at a similar qual-
ity level [38]. The High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC)
standard, scheduled to be finalized in early 2013, provides
another leap in coding efficiency (a further bit rate reduction
of 50% is targeted at the same visual quality as H.264/AVC
High Profile) [18].
In Fig. 2, a typical architecture of an encoder is shown.
This encoding loop structure is common to most state-of-the-
art video coding schemes, including H.264/AVC and HEVC.
First, the uncompressed video frame is predicted, us-
ing either temporal (motion-compensated) information based
upon previously encoded frames (reference frame(s)) and/or
spatially causal information from the currently encoded frame
(i.e. intra-prediction). The prediction residual (i.e. the differ-
ence between prediction and original frame) is subsequently
transformed and quantized, which enables lossy encoding,
and the final bit rate is controlled by a rate-distortion opti-
mization mechanism. The resulting quantized coefficients are
(i) further entropy coded and packetized in a bitstream that
contains other syntax elements such as motion vectors and
prediction modes and (ii) inversely quantized, transformed,
added to the prediction, loop filtered to remove disturbing
block artifacts and finally stored as a new reference frame.
The closing of the prediction loop in such a codec is necessary
to guarantee synchronization of the reference frame between
the encoder and decoder. In the illustrated coding architecture
(Fig. 2), the potential encryption and watermarking locations
are indicated respectively by ‘E’ and ‘W’.
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Fig. 2. High-level encoder view.
One of the prerequisites for defining a format-compliant
(partial) encryption algorithm that allows for operations such
as watermarking and transcoding, is a classification of the
data sets in the video bitstream, based on the knowledge of
the video coding standard. Based on such a classification,
an appropriate selection can be made of which data in the
video bitstream is most suited for encryption, watermarking
and transcoding. A similar strategy has been specified for
the secured compression of JPEG 2000 images in [26]. In the
case of H.264/AVC and HEVC, the streams roughly comprise
information for so-called prediction mode signaling, motion
data, and residual (DCT) data. The prediction modes give
an indication of whether intra or inter-prediction is used, and
which type and partitioning is used for each macroblock or
coding unit. For inter-coded macroblocks, motion data is
transmitted, consisting of reference picture indices and mo-
tion vector data. The residual data contains the prediction
error after transformation and quantization. A suitable classi-
fication of bitstream elements will have an impact on the suc-
cess of the encryption and the robustness of the watermarks.
Transcoding: classification
In general, transcoding aims at modifying the properties of
a (video) bitstream, preferably with lower complexity than
a combination of decoding and (time-consuming) encoding.
Depending on the targeted application of the transcoder, we
can distinguish between different adaptation operations, in-
cluding temporal (frame rate), spatial (resolution), and bit
rate transcoding [34].
The most common type of transcoding operations for
video streams is a reduction of the bit rate, also known as
transrating, by reducing the precision of the information in
the bitstream. Typically, this is achieved by increasing the
quantization step size, called quantization parameter (QP), of
the residual data (requantization) [8]. Another class of tran-
srating techniques selectively removes residual coefficients
from the bitstream (dynamic rate shaping) [9]. Both of these
classes primarily target the residual data in the bitstream,
while leaving other data unchanged. Note that when larger
reductions of the bit rate are desired, not only residual, but
also the motion data (such as motion vectors) can be adapted
during transcoding, as in [25].
A second type of adaptation is a reduction of the spatial
resolution, which has a major impact on the bitstreams, and
will change not only the residual data, but also the prediction
modes and the motion data.
Third, frame rate reduction can be achieved by dropping
frames, e.g. by a factor of two. When using hierarchical
coding patterns in H.264/AVC or HEVC, this can easily be
achieved, including in the semi-encrypted domain. The scal-
able video coding (SVC) extension of H.264/AVC can be
used to add intrinsic scalability to video streams, by using
a layered approach during encoding. In this way, quality
or spatial layers can be dropped from the SVC stream, and
the resulting subset can be decoded independently, resulting
in a lower-quality or lower-resolution version. In this way,
transcoding operations are reduced to simple ‘cut-and-paste’
operations, and decoding/encoding algorithms are avoided
altogether. In contrast to H.264/AVC, however, SVC has
not made a breakthrough in the broadcast world. Given its
high computational complexity (in particular at the encoder
side) and its bandwidth overhead (the introduction of extra
layers increases the bit rate compared to H.264/AVC [28]),
broadcasters are not eager to replace their existing equip-
ment with SVC-compatible hardware or software. Although
SVC provides a legitimate solution for secure video distribu-
tion, we focus on solutions for prevalent standards such as
H.264/AVC. The encryption and watermarking approaches
discussed in this paper for H.264/AVC can be readily ex-
tended to SVC (similar to e.g. in [32]).
Encryption
Oceans of choices for video scrambling
As discussed earlier, we focus only on partial encryption tech-
niques. Based on where the encryption takes place, partial
encryption methods can be categorized as in [30]. Encryption
before compression techniques are codec-independent (indi-
cated by the first ‘E’ position in Fig. 2) such as pixel position
permutation but lead to less compressible videos. However,
it might be an applicable choice for region-of-interest en-
cryption. Bitstream oriented encryption approaches are more
straightforward and thus can preserve less functionality (sec-
ond ‘E’ position in Fig. 2). They encrypt the whole encoded
bitstream (naive approach) or only a fraction of it (e.g. head-
ers, different frame types, or the NAL unit payloads) which
can still allow compliant adaptation, packetization or even
lower quality playback in case of multi-layered SVC. The
compression integrated encryption approaches are codec spe-
cific by nature. At the expense of some loss of cryptographic
security, they can preserve useful functionality such as format
compliance, transcodability, enabling watermark embedding
and so on. Numerous approaches have been reported that
scramble the signs and/or the levels of the residual DCT co-
efficients [36] and the motion vector differences [33], [37],
or a subset of these. Encrypting the intra [24] and inter [37]
prediction modes can also destroy the structure of the image
to certain degree. Alternative approaches have been proposed
to scan the DCT coefficients in a secret order and even the
Variable Length Coding (VLC) tables have been scrambled.
A detailed survey on the approaches and their provided func-
tionality can be found in [30], whereas [17] presents all the
necessary background information.
Stream and block ciphers
As format compliance and transcodability are strict require-
ments in this work, the bitstream can be only partially en-
crypted. Symmetric stream- as well as block ciphers are good
candidates for this purpose. The former ones can encrypt ar-
bitrary amount of bits, the latter ones are block-based. How-
ever, there are numerous modes of operation defined for block
ciphers, some of which make them behave as a stream cipher.
This way the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [20] can
be used in our system which grants high cryptographic secu-
rity and renders the key unrecoverable by typical attacks such
as known-plaintext- or ciphertext-only attack.
Fig. 3. Encryption - decryption in: (a) Output feedback mode
and (b) Cipher feedback mode.
Fig. 3 shows the principles of how the encryption works.
The encryptable data is considered as a continuous bitstream
(Pi), each bit of which gets XOR-ed with a bit of a pseudo
random sequence which is generated by a secure cipher (e.g.
AES). If the same sequence is also generated at the decoder
side and gets XOR-ed with the received ciphertext (Ci) then
the two XOR operations cancel each other out, which renders
the original plaintext. Since the pseudo random sequence de-
pends on a key, the decryption is possible only for the entitled
users. This key should be derived from the pre-shared long-
term key and may change at an arbitrary interval. In this setup,
we can request an arbitrary number of pseudo random bits (j)
at each use which allows us to integrate the encryption part in
a flexible way in the video codec wherever it is needed. De-
pending on what the input of the cipher is (statei in Fig. 3),
there are several standardized modes of operation [21] that
can be applied here: in counter mode a simple counter is fed
to the AES which gets incremented after each AES call. In
the output feedback and cipher feedback modes the output of
AES or the ciphertext is used respectively. In the former two
modes, the random sequence is completely independent from
the data stream, thus even offline random sequence generation
is possible, however, synchronization problems may occur.
Cipher feedback mode is self-synchronizing but datastream-
dependent.
Watermarking
Introduction to watermarking
Digital watermarking - the embedding of an imperceptible
mark in the data - complements encryption in the sense that
it can extend the protection of a multimedia item after its de-
cryption. It allows the embedding of arbitrary information
(watermark), indicated with a “puzzle piece” in Fig. 4, into
digital media (images, video, audio) by applying impercepti-
ble, systematic alterations to the data (coverwork) depending
on a key, which is needed at the detector.
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Fig. 4. Watermark embedding and detection.
In a blind detection system, the decoding function takes
the received (possibly attacked) watermarked signal and a key
to produce an estimate of the watermark. In the non-blind or
informed detection system, the decoding function in addition
has access to the original host signal, which increases detec-
tion performance, but creates a communication and storage
burden in practice.
Research in watermarking emerged in the 1990s, and in
the meantime numerous practical systems have been pub-
lished and theoretical bounds have been achieved. An excel-
lent in-depth overview on the theory and security aspects of
watermarking systems in general can be found in the tutorial
paper by Moulin and Koetter [22] and in the book [7].
Any watermarking scheme is subject to the trade-off be-
tween its perceptual impact, robustness against signal pro-
cessing operations and/or malicious attacks and the amount of
information (payload) that can be transmitted reliably within
the coverwork.
Lattice Quantization Index Modulation
In this paper, we chose to employ Quantization Index Modu-
lation (QIM) watermarking, introduced by Chen and Wornell
in 1998 - a superior (substitutive) technique in an information-
theoretical sense [5, 10] for blind detection. The QIM-
watermarking system is based upon a good choice of a set of
quantizers, which allows one to vary from a so-called fragile
(designed to be easily destroyed if the watermarked image
is manipulated in the slightest manner), over semi-fragile
(designed to degrade under “unwanted” attacks) to a robust
(designed to resist attempts to remove or destroy the water-
mark) watermarking technique depending on the stepsize or
strength parameter ∆.
In Fig. 5, we depicted a scalar quantizer with stepsize
∆/2, which is split into two shifted coarse quantizers with
stepsize ∆ in order to embed one bit in a (real) sample s taken
from the coverwork. These samples can be (luminance) pixel
values, however for the sake of imperceptibility and robust-
ness it is advised to work in a transform domain, like the DCT
or DWT, where one easily can select a range of coefficients
with low visual impact that are less vulnerable under attacks.
To embed a 0-bit, the sample s is quantized to the value as-
sociated with the nearest symbol with label 0 (represented by
a circle), while for a 1-bit we move s to the value associated
with the nearest symbol with label 1 (represented by a cross).
Given a watermarked, possibly attacked, sample s, we detect
the embedded bit as the label of the nearest symbol of the fine
quantizer, what is referred to as a minimum distance decoder.
A classical example of the fine quantizer is ∆Z, where we use
the even multiples of ∆ for the circle quantizer, whereas his
coset - the odd multiples - plays the role of the cross quantizer.
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Fig. 5. Two shifted scalar quantizers with strength ∆ to em-
bed one bit in a sample s.
Most of the time, scalar quantizers are employed because
of their simplicity, although they are outperformed by lattice
quantizers [22]. Recall that a lattice (in Rn) is defined as a
collection of vectors that are integral combinations of a set of
basis vectors in Rn. We point to [6] as the reference work
on properties of lattices and associated quantizers. In Fig. 6,
the centers of the dotted hexagons form a so-called hexagonal
lattice for which the ones indicated with 01 and 10 can be seen
as basis vectors. Similarly to the scalar case, this fine lattice is
split into four similar coarse hexagonal lattices: one is given
by the centers of the solid hexagons (such as 00), while the
other three are shifted over the coset leaders indicated with
01, 10 and 11. The associated quantizers can now be used to
embed two bits (resp. 00, 01, 10 and 11) into samples taken
from R2.
Fig. 6. Hexagonal lattice with 4 coset leaders.
It is easily seen that the robustness of a lattice QIM sys-
tem depends on the distance between the coarse lattice coset
leaders in which a lattice can be split, which on its turn im-
pacts the perceptibility. The trade-off between robustness and
perceptibility of lattice QIM is therefore related to the sphere-
packing problem of lattices in Euclidean space. In [1], we
developed a methodology to create parametrized lattice QIM
systems based on so-called self-similar lattices, where we re-
late the rate, i.e. the number of embedded bits per vector of
coverwork samples, with the number of cosets in which we
can split the fine lattice through rotation and scaling. We em-
ployed, in particular, this technique to the Gosset lattice E8,
which is the subgroup of vectors in R8 for which the coor-
dinates are all in Z or all in Z + 12 and their sum is even.
This lattice is self-similar and optimal for the sphere-packing
problem in 8 dimensions. We showed that the resulting lattice
QIM system has high robustness at the cost of a low percep-
tual impact together with flexible payload possibilities.
Watermarking for the compressed domain
Concerning compressed-domain watermarking, there are ba-
sically three places in a video encoder loop (pictured in Fig. 2)
to perform watermark embedding:
1. Pre-encoding watermarking: Watermarking can be
applied prior to encoding, on the uncompressed data.
Most image or video watermarking schemes operate in
this way, in which case the video encoding is consid-
ered an attack which can harm the watermark. Depend-
ing on the quality of the encoded stream (determined
by the quantization in the encoder), the watermark can
be damaged or removed.
2. Inter-encoding watermarking: By adding the wa-
termark in the encoder loop (indicated as the second
‘W’ position), the watermark can be inserted in (al-
ready quantized) data in the encoder, hereby exploiting
properties of the encoded bitstream. In this case, the
encoding itself is no longer an attack to the watermark
(see e.g. [3] for a survey article on watermarking in the
H.264/AVC compressed domain and [14] for a recent
authentication system therein).
3. Post-encoding watermarking: Furthermore, the wa-
termark can be added outside the encoder loop, either
in the encoder, or at a later stage in the video distri-
bution (e.g. as a transcoding step). Note that the ad-
dition of a watermark outside of the encoder loop has
to be done cautiously, since changes caused by the wa-
termark can accumulate over time and introduce drift
throughout the video stream.
Obviously, the video quality will be affected proportional
to the strength of the watermark, reducing the overall encod-
ing performance irrespective to the location where the water-
mark is applied in the distribution chain.
A novel H.264/ AVC & HEVC format-compliant
encryption and watermarking system
In case of partial encryption, there are a number of com-
ponents in the bitstream that can be encrypted and water-
marked. Fig. 7 gives a high-level perspective on our proposed
combined protection system based on the inter-encoding wa-
termarking scenario, which is novel according to the gen-
eral methodologies described in the survey [30]. The input
frames on the left side (either intra-coded (I) or inter-coded
(P or B) frames) contain several data sets, which encompass
parameters, prediction mode information (for intra or inter-
prediction modes), motion vectors and residual data. The data
sets that are affected by encryption are indicated with a “key”
image, while the residual coefficients, indicated with a “puz-
zle piece”, are watermarked.
We chose to encrypt those components that do not disable
rate change. Encrypting the intra-prediction modes and the
sign bits of the DCT coefficients takes care of all the intra-
blocks whereas changing inter-prediction modes and sign
bits of the motion vector differences scrambles inter-predicted
parts. Sign bit encryption refers to a possible sign bit change
whereas encrypting the modes implies changing the actual
mode to another one without violating the semantics and bit-
stream compliance. As the four data sets are completely in-
dependent from each other, they can be selectively encrypted.
For example, intra-prediction modes are interchangeable in
general, but not all modes are available along the top and
the left borders of each frame due to the lack of neighbors.
In case of inter-prediction modes, only 8 × 16 and 16 × 8
partitions are interchangeable since the other partition types
require a different number of motion vectors [37], hence
changing them would lead to undecodable video. Due to
the fact that encryption occurs in the final, output bitstream
(outside of the encoding loop), no bit rate increase arises.
For watermarking the residual DCT coefficients, we chose
to employ our E8-lattice QIM system, as it displays good
robustness (needed for transcoding and possible other video
processing attacks after delivery), low perceptibility (so that it
hardly affects the quality of valuable content), while offering
flexibility in payload (so that it can be adapted to a specific
application in mind: copyright protection, traitor tracing, au-
thentication, quality assessment [4] etc.). and blind detection
(the original might not be at hand).
During transcoding, the encrypted data sets of the in-
put video stream will be simply copied to the output stream
without interfering with the encryption. The residual coeffi-
cients containing the watermark, however, will be affected by
transcoding. Transcoding approaches will either requantize
(leading to a coarser approximation of the coefficients) or se-
lectively remove coefficients (by clipping e.g. high-frequency
transform coefficients) to reduce the bit rate.
Performance demonstration
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility and con-
straints of a system combining encryption, watermarking,
and transcoding in an end-to-end video distribution system.
Because the previously described encryption strategy only
limits the design of the watermarking and transcoding al-
gorithms and does not influence the performance of those
techniques, encryption performance will be evaluated first.
Then, the impact of video compression and transcoding on
the watermark will be demonstrated.
To evaluate the performance of our implemented architec-
ture, a sample set of 22 video sequences with varying prop-
erties (corresponding to the test set used in HEVC standard-
ization [2], with sequences ranging from WQVGA to 2560×
1600 resolution) were analyzed both visually and objectively
after encryption, watermarking, and transcoding. The video
streams were compressed at representative bit rates, in line
with the coding conditions used in standardization.
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Fig. 7. Interaction of transcoding with encrypted and watermarked bitstreams (for intra and inter-coded frames).
Encryption
Encryption takes place during the encoding process on the
video stream elements indicated in Fig. 7. In general, com-
pression at a higher bit rate generates more residual data thus
proportionally more elements to encrypt. The total amount
of encryptable data varied between 19% and 50% of the bit-
stream in our test set. We used two objective quality metrics
to measure the effectiveness of the partial encryption algo-
rithm.
Peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) is the most commonly
used method to measure quality degradation. It is based on the
mean of the squared difference of two images. Most sources
in this field evaluate the encrypted videos based on comparing
the PSNR values. However, a lower PSNR does not necessar-
ily correspond to a more scrambled frame.
Although the Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) [35] has
been used less frequently in publications to assess the encryp-
tion performance, we have found this metric more meaningful
than PSNR in our application. The SSIM index of two win-
dows x and y (typically of size 8× 8) is defined as:
SSIM(x, y) =
(2µxµy + C1)(2σxy + C2)
(µ2x + µ
2
y + C1)(σ
2
x + σ
2
y + C2)
, (1)
where µ, σ are window averages and (co)variances respec-
tively, making this technique less sensitive to noise. The Ci
values refer to constants that depend on the bit-depth of the
image. This metric was designed to take into account that spa-
tially close pixels have strong dependencies which is also re-
ferred to as structural information. Since the structural differ-
ence of two images is exactly what we want to measure when
assessing encryption techniques, we have decided to rely on
this metric. Its output is a real number between 0 and 1, where
a larger number means higher similarity. In our tests, the av-
erage scores showed that the structure of the frames could be
sufficiently degraded in case of both codecs. H.264/AVC pro-
duced scores between 0.16 and 0.2, whereas the HEVC tests
ended with even lower values that fell between 0.06 and 0.13
as seen in Fig. 8 (which shows average results for all test se-
quences).
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Fig. 8. Average SSIM scores
Since every I/B/P block is affected in some way by the en-
cryption, the variance of the resulting PSNR and SSIM values
is consistently low throughout the whole video.
Although we present average scores in this work, it is im-
portant to mention that not every video can be degraded to
the same extent. The quality of sharp, high-motion content
becomes much more scrambled after encryption than that of
low-motion video with a static background (e.g. in video con-
ferencing or remote desktop scenarios).
Both H.264/AVC and HEVC encode only the residual
(difference) between the actual and predicted pixel values (as
was shown in Fig. 2). In case of accurate prediction, the en-
ergy contained in the residual is small, leaving limited room
for encryption. The same holds for the motion vectors, where
only the difference between the actual motion vector and a
motion vector predictor is coded (derived from the motion
vectors of neighboring blocks). Therefore, if there is only
limited motion in the video, the magnitude of the difference
is not large either. Hence, little change is induced when the
encryption flips the motion vector signs, making the shapes
slightly visible in extreme cases. The lower the quality of the
encoded video, the more the frames get averaged out which
blurs static backgrounds. Such flat areas require minimal
data to encode, therefore minimal number of changes can be
induced by encryption which might lead to information reve-
lation. This phenomenon is demonstrated in Fig. 9, where the
edge detected frames help to compare the output.
Fig. 9. Comparison of the original (left) and the encrypted
videos at QP=12 (middle) and QP=42 (right) along with their
corresponding edge detected versions (bottom).
In general, it can be stated that for entertainment purposes
scrambling performance of the described encryption system
is more than adequate.
Watermarking and compression
In this demonstration, both watermarking before encoding
and during encoding are investigated.
First, we applied the pre-encoding watermarking sce-
nario, after which a video encoder compresses the video
information with a certain quality loss. This quality reduc-
tion encompasses both video and watermark information
loss, measured by the PSNR and the bit error rate (BER) for
watermark detection, respectively.
We embedded 256 bits per frame in the mid-frequency
DCT domain with varying strengths using the E8-lattice at
a rate of 4 bits per 8 coefficients. The compression impact
is graphically represented in Fig. 10 for a representative se-
quence (the ParkScene test sequence with full HD (1080p)
resolution, which contains a combination of panning and mo-
tion). The curves were obtained by coding at four different
quality settings (QP values of 22, 27, 32, and 37). Similar
results were obtained for the other test sequences.
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Fig. 10. Bit error rate of the watermark detection with an
indicated strength (∆) of 6, 12, or 18 after H.264/AVC or
HEVC compression.
It is clear that video compression at higher quality re-
sults in lower bit error rates for the watermark detection; in-
tuitively, a lower watermarking strength results in higher bit
error rates after compression. Note that when using error-
correction codes (e.g. Turbo codes) a BER lower than about
10% may be successfully corrected at the cost of a larger pay-
load (which is not a hurdle for the watermarking technique
employed). Finally, we note that when the same video is
compressed to the same quality (as measured by PSNR re-
duction) by both HEVC and H.264/AVC, we observe simi-
lar BER trends, but less watermarking information survives
under HEVC. This is caused by the more advanced coding
modes introduced by HEVC and the resulting higher decor-
relation of the signal (or entropy reduction), which makes it
more prone to bit error sensitivity.
In a second experiment, inter-encoding watermarking is
applied, indicated as the second ‘W’ position in Fig. 2. When
applying a watermark during or after the compression pro-
cess there is no negative impact of the compression itself on
the watermark. The watermark still slightly reduces the pic-
ture quality, but this time the compression does not form an
attack on the watermark. Possible bit errors can only be in-
troduced when transcoding operations are applied afterwards.
Similar to the previous experiment, we embedded 256 bits per
frame with varying strengths, this time on the transformed and
quantized residual data. Fig. 11 shows the impact on the rate-
distortion performance by inserting watermarks with an ex-
ample strength of 18 in both H.264/AVC and HEVC. For the
highest rate point, a maximum quality loss of about 0.6 dB in
PSNR is obtained for H.264/AVC. Because the watermarking
process at this location is ‘in the loop’, rate-distortion opti-
mization (RDO) will keep the introduced loss low, by care-
fully selecting blocks which are affected to a minimal extent
by the watermark. Note that this is not the case when intro-
ducing the watermark at the third ‘W’ position (outside the
loop, or after encoding). In this case, the locations for water-
mark insertion have to be carefully evaluated, since they can
have a significant impact on the bit rate, or introduce drift in
the video stream when errors in the bitstream accumulate.
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Fig. 11. Compression efficiency (rate-distortion) results
for H.264/AVC and HEVC watermarking with an example
strength (∆) of 18.
Impact of transcoding
After encryption and watermark insertion, we subjected the
bitstreams to a transcoding process, where the residual data in
the bitstreams was parsed, requantized with a coarser quanti-
zation step size, and (entropy) coded again in the output video
bitstream. This resulted in a lower bit rate, and unavoidably
a lower quality of the output streams. Previous research has
indicated that drift caused by requantization of intra-coded
blocks in the bitstreams has a major impact on the quality of
the transcoding video [8]. For this reason, we apply requan-
tization only to inter-coded macroblocks or coding units. De-
pending on the sequence, bit rate reductions of approximately
5-40% were tested, which corresponds to realistic transcoding
scenarios.
Note that in all cases the encryption was untouched by the
transcoding process, supporting the commutative property of
our combined system. The impact on the watermark is il-
lustrated in Table 1, showing that watermark embedding in
HEVC is less sensitive to transcoding than watermarking in
H.264/AVC. This is explained by the more efficient predic-
tion modes and the RDO process of HEVC, which is highly
selective in the locations in which watermarking bits can be
embedded. Since watermarking is applied in the loop, the
RDO process of the encoder will only decide to insert bits in
regions that contain more residual energy (and larger coeffi-
cient magnitudes). Accordingly, since HEVC has more ad-
vanced prediction algorithms than H.264/AVC, fewer bits can
be potentially embedded, but they will more easily survive
requantization attacks.
Conclusions
End-to-end video security introduces several challenges that
can be tackled when tailoring cryptography and signal pro-
cessing operations to each other. We presented the use of par-
tial encryption techniques in a trade-off between security and
preserved functionality.
The proposed encryption of a combination of data sets in
H.264/AVC and HEVC achieves consistently low SSIM val-
ues throughout the encrypted video streams, showing the ef-
fectiveness of the scrambling operation. Nonetheless, when
considering the encryption, a few elements affect its perfor-
mance such as homogeneous backgrounds and the absence
of motion. In certain applications (e.g. video conferencing)
these factors cannot be eliminated so somewhat lower secu-
rity can be granted. However, the proposed system provides
ample security in large application areas such as video broad-
cast and pay-per-view services.
Two important signal processing operations in secure
video distribution chains (watermarking and transcoding)
were shown to be commutative with the partial encryption
scheme. The additional watermarking protection layer offers
enough flexibility to be applied before or during the en-
coder/encrypting loop due to the more than satisfying trade-
off between robustness, perceptibility and payload of the
E8-lattice based QIM-watermarking system we employed.
A limited overhead in rate-distortion performance is induced
for watermarking in the compressed domain.
The effect of transcoding on embedded watermarks was
demonstrated for both H.264/AVC and HEVC, which shows
that typical bit rate adaptations can be performed with limited
impact on the BER of the watermark.
H.264/AVC HEVC
DQP ∆ = 6 ∆ = 12 ∆ = 18 ∆ = 6 ∆ = 12 ∆ = 18
BER PSNR BER PSNR BER PSNR BER PSNR BER PSNR BER PSNR
1 0.00 56.41 0.00 56.14 0.00 57.32 0.00 54.83 0.00 46.04 0.00 49.06
2 0.00 50.78 0.00 51.14 0.00 51.62 0.00 49.09 0.00 43.00 0.00 46.21
3 0.00 48.43 0.00 49.30 0.00 49.28 0.00 48.85 0.00 42.74 0.00 46.26
4 0.00 45.46 0.00 45.68 0.00 45.61 0.00 42.03 0.00 39.60 0.00 40.76
5 0.17 42.78 0.11 42.83 0.08 42.88 0.02 42.15 0.01 39.54 0.00 41.08
6 0.17 42.44 0.11 42.62 0.08 42.68 0.02 42.04 0.01 39.48 0.00 40.93
8 0.17 42.19 0.11 42.46 0.08 42.53 0.02 41.62 0.01 39.00 0.00 40.31
10 0.25 41.95 0.11 42.07 0.08 42.11 0.19 41.38 0.01 38.59 0.00 40.21
Table 1. Watermark bit error rate (BER) and PSNR [dB] results after transcoding with differentDQP = QPout−QPin values,
applied to watermarking with different strengths (∆ = 6, 12, or 18).
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